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STATUTORY REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES OF MARYLAND DECEDENTS,
MINORS AND INCOMPETENTS
By SHALE D. STILLER* and ROGER D. REDDEN**
"The time is ripe for betterment....
Let us gather up the driftwood, and
leave the waters pure."'
On Monday morning, March 24, 1969, Governor Mandel signed
Senate Bill 316 and House Bill 558. Other than two items of emer-
gency legislation, these were the first Acts signed by the new Governor,
and they became Chapters 3 and 4 of the Laws of Maryland of 1969.
It may not be hyperbolic to refer to these two measures jointly
as the most significant statutory reform of private law to have been
originated in Maryland in this century. Chapter 3 is a recodification
and revision of what is commonly known as the "testamentary law"
but which is more appropriately denoted as the law of decedents'
estates. Chapter 4 is a recodification and revision of the laws relating
to the conservation and administration of property belonging to minors,
incompetents and other legally "disabled" persons. The purpose of
the enactment of a new Article 93 by Chapter 3 is set forth in Sec-
tion 1-105 (a) :'
The purposes of this Article are to simplify the administra-
tion of estates, to reduce the expenses of administration, to clarify
the law governing decedents' estates, and to eliminate certain
provisions of existing law which are archaic, often meaningless
under modern procedures and no longer useful. This Article
* Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland;
Lecturer, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1954, Hamilton College;
LL.B., 1957, Yale University; Member, Governor's Commission to Review and Revise
the Testamentary Laws of Maryland.
** Partner, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland; A.B., 1954, Yale University;
LL.B., 1957, University of Maryland School of Law; Member, Governor's Commission
to Review and Revise the Testamentary Laws of Maryland.
1. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. Riv. 113, 126 (1921).
2. Ch. 3, § 1, [1969] Md. Laws 9 [hereinafter cited by section number of new
Article 93 only].
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shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes.
Almost identical language appears in Section 104 of new Article 93A,
enacted by Chapter 4, with respect to the estates of minors and dis-
abled persons.
Chapter 4 takes effect on July 1, 1969. Moreover, all guardians,
committees, conservators, and custodians appointed before July 1, 1969,
are thereafter to proceed under and be governed by the new law.' The
old procedures have been abolished. Chapter 3, on the other hand,
does not become effective until January 1, 1970 and will then apply
generally to the estates of persons dying on or after that date.
The purpose of this Article is to explain the history and substance
of both pieces of legislation.
HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
The testamentary law of Maryland was originally codified as
Chapter 101 of the Acts of 1798.' Although this was an elegant and
organic statute, one hundred seventy years of amendments located in
odd places and using inconsistent language not only destroyed the
1798 elegance but often deprived it of its meaning and left a rather
shabby statutory system for administering decedents' estates.
The testamentary law is archaic: the framework is patterned
on Chapter 101 of the Acts of 1798, legislation which, while
coherent and viable in an essentially agricultural and less dynamic
economy, has little relevance to 1968. It is disorganized: changes
seem to have been tossed into the Code at random. As the Report
demonstrates, the testamentary law of Maryland, although it is
supposed to be contained in the Article of the Maryland Code
titled "Testamentary Law," is scattered through at least 15 dif-
ferent Articles. Even Article 93 itself is devoid of any coherent
order. It is cumbersome: it requires a maximum of red tape in
the administration of an estate; yet, in some instances, its pro-
cedures may well be unconstitutional because of the availability
of so many ex parte actions which can be taken without notice
to those primarily interested in the proper administration of the
3. Ch. 4, § 5, [1969] Md. Laws 135. The Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals is currently revising Rules H, L, R
and V of the Maryland Rules of Procedure to reflect the changes in Chapter 4.
4. § 12-102(a). See also Ch. 3, § 10, [1969] Md. Laws 105.
5. A history of this codification is set forth in Gans, Sources of Maryland
Testamentary Law, 18 TRANS. MD. STAT4 BAR Ass'N 193 (1913). It is interesting
to note one aspect of reverse inflation referred to in Mr. Gans' article. Chancellor
Hanson, who drafted the 1798 law, was paid $1,000 by the Treasurer of the Western
Shore for his efforts. No mention is given for the reason the Eastern Shore did not
contribute. The Governor's Commission of 1965-1969 was not compensated.
In addition to testamentary law revision, the legislatures of 1798 and 1969
had one other common predilection - the law of animals. Compare Ch. 22, [1798]
Md. Laws (providing a bounty for wolves in Frederick County) with Ch. 30, [1969]
.Md. Laws 167 (repealing the section of the Baltimore City Code defining a cartload
of manure). See also 8 Op. ATr'y GtN. 266 (1923) ; ch. 54, [1958] Md. Laws 195.
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estate. It is illogical: the artificial distinction between real prop-
erty and personal property, for example, so important at common
law, can no longer be justified in administering an estate. It is
sometimes unintelligible: provisions such as Sections 48-51 of
Article 93 have not only become atrophied from disuse but cannot
even be explained in rational terms.'
H. L. Mencken could well have been aiming at the jumble of this subject
in the Annotated Code of Maryland when he remarked that if doctors
were as progressive as lawyers, we would still be bleeding patients, as
in the fifteenth century.
In 1965, the Registers of Wills Association of Maryland sponsored
House Joint Resolution No. 6 which requested the appointment of a
gubernatorial commission to study and revise the Maryland laws relat-
ing to testamentary matters and death taxes. This proposal was en-
acted as Joint Resolution No. 23 of 1965, and the Commission was
appointed by Governor Tawes under the Chairmanship of William L.
Henderson, former Chief Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The Commission membership represented a fair cross-section of those
experienced in matters dealing with the administration of estates and
related tax matters and included registers of wills and members of the
General Assembly as well as lawyers, several of whom were former
assistant attorneys general who had represented the registers.7
The Second Report of the Commission, dated December 5, 1968,
proposed a comprehensive recodification and revision of the testa-
mentary laws.8 This Report was sent to a large number of lawyers
and other interested parties,9 and the Commission received extensive
comment on the Report, both oral and written. It conducted an all-day
hearing on January 8, 1969, and presented the proposals to the Mary-
land State Bar Association during its Winter meeting later in the
month. As a result of the comments received, the Commission made
6. SECOND REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW AND REVISE THE
TESTAMENTARY LAWS OP MARYLAND ii (1968).
7. The other members of the Commission who served from the very beginning
were Robert L. Karwacki, Joshua W. Miles, Roger D. Redden, John G. Rouse, Jr.,
Ruth R. Startt, Shale D. Stiller and G. Van Velsor Wolf. Those appointed after the
Commission began its work who are still on the Commission are Senator Thomas M.
Anderson, Jr., Speaker of the House Thomas Hunter Lowe, Registers of Wills James
M. Roby and Gertrude C. Wright, and C. M. Zacharski, Jr. Members of the original
Commission who, for various reasons, were unable to continue to serve, are Judge
C. Warren Colgan, Jr., Senator J. Albert Roney, Judge John P. Moore, and Walter
Addison. The Commission also had the invaluable assistance of Melvin J. Sykes, the
present editor of P. SYKES, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE (1956).
8. The First Report, published in December, 1966, dealt solely with recom-
mendations for simplifying the death tax structure in Maryland. The statute recom-
mended by the First Report was given an unfavorable report by the House Ways and
Means Committee. The Commission was advised that this was due solely to concern
that the new estate tax would not have generated enough revenue. It is anticipated
that the Commission will submit another recommendation on this subject to the 1970
Session of the General Assembly.
9. The Report was sent not only to the Governor and all members of the General
Assembly, but to every lawyer in good standing as a practitioner on the rolls of the
Clients' Security Trust Fund, to every Register of Wills, to every judge, to every
trust company, and to numerous other interested individuals.
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a substantial number of changes in its proposed legislation prior to its
introduction as an Administration measure, in the form of Senate Bill
No. 316 by the President and House Bill No. 499 by the Speaker."0
The Senate Bill moved first. The Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee held hearings and reported the Bill favorably, with amend-
ments. On the Senate floor, the Bill passed second and third readings
unanimously. From there it went to the House, was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, which also held hearings, was favorably reported
without further amendment and was enacted without dissent on March
17, 1969. The Bill, as enacted, did not receive a single negative vote
in committee or on the floor in either house.
The laws dealing with guardianships and committees were just
as archaic, illogical and inconsistent as the testamentary law. In one
sense the situation was even worse, because in the entire history of
the Maryland Bar, no one seems to have had sufficient interest or
practice in guardianship and committee law to make any specific pro-
posal for the cleansing of this Augean stable.
The Governor's Commission recommended an entirely new Article
93 in its Second Report. However, part of old Article 93 consisted of
some forty sections dealing with "guardians and wards." Since the
Governor's Commission was not charged with the responsibility of
rewriting the laws on guardians, it felt constrained only to collect all
these sections from Article 93 and re-enact them as part of a new Article
93A." A committee of the Maryland State Bar Association's Section
on Estates and Trusts12 was then studying the Maryland laws relating
not only to guardianships but also to all devices for protecting the
property of minors, incompetents, and other disabled persons. This
committee made its report in December, 1968, almost concurrent with
that of the Governor's Commission. This report, taking into account
the recommendations of the Governor's Commission, recommended the
enactment of a wholly new Article 93A. This proposal received the
unanimous support of the Council of the Section of Estates and Trusts
and of the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association. The
Report was mailed to every Register of Wills and Circuit Court Clerk,
from whom no comments were received. In the form of House Bill
10. These changes were explained in a document called "Summary of Changes
Made in Second Report of Governor's Commission to Review and Revise the Testa-
mentary Law of Maryland and Incorporated into Proposed Article 93, Decedents'
Estates, S.B. No. 316 and H.B. 499." This document bears the date January 31, 1969.
11. When Senate Bill 316 was introduced, obviously no one could know whether
House Bill 558 - whose provisions were entirely inconsistent with that part of Senate
Bill 316 which created a new Article 93A out of the "guardian and ward" materials
in Article 93 - would pass. Therefore, § 8 of Senate Bill 316 (Ch. 3, § 8, [1969]
Md. Laws 105) provides that if any Act passed at the 1969 session changes the sub-
stance and wording of the Article 93A set forth in Chapter 3, the other Act "shall
be deemed to supersede the provisions of said . . . Article 93A." Even if this provision
had not been included in Senate Bill 316, because House Bill 558 was signed after
Senate Bill 316, the provisions of Senate Bill 316 which are inconsistent with House
Bill 558 are automatically prevented from becoming law. See MD. ANN. CODS art. 1,
§ 17 (1968).
12. The Chairman of the Section on Estates and Trusts was J. Nicholas Shriver,
Jr. The special committee consisted of Winston T. Brundige, Chairman, Shale D.
Stiller, Robert M. Thomas, and C. M. Zacharski, Jr.
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No. 558, sponsored by Delegate Martin A. Kircher, the committee's
proposal, with very minor amendments, passed both houses without
a dissenting vote.
GENERAL MATTERS IN NEW ARTICLE 93
Real Property in the Probate Estate
Real property has been made a part of the probate estate"3 and,
with one exception,14 there is now no distinction between real property
and personal property in the administration of estates. This change
will give the personal representative complete authority over and
responsibility for real property and will require him to pay the taxes
on the property, to insure it, and to collect its rents. 5 The devolution
of title to real property will necessarily become less complicated. Title
will automatically pass to the personal representative. If he does not
sell the real property during the course of administration, he will, in
order to distribute the property to the appropriate beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries, execute a deed as evidence of the distributee's title. In addition
to any other indexing, the deed must be indexed in the grantor index
under the decedent's name.' 6
Abolition of Dower
The ancient estate of dower, so rarely used, has been completely
abolished. 17 The modern provisions for statutory shares consisting of
outright interests in a deceased spouse's property have generally re-
placed the ancient concepts of dower and curtesy, which consisted only
of a life estate in one-third of the decedent's fee simple real estate.'"
In addition, the intended protection of the estate of dower has often
been nullified as a practical matter if a husband takes title in the form
of a life estate with unrestricted powers of disposition, or if he causes
a one cent ground rent to be placed on the property before he takes
title, or if he forms a corporation to take title to any real estate he may
contract to buy. The major effect of the abolition of dower will not,
13. § 1-301.
14. The one exception is the computation of commissions for the personal repre-
sentative. Since the commission structure was not changed by the new statute, it was
necessary to exclude the value of real estate from the value of the probate estate in
determining commissions. See § 7-602(b) and discussion in text at note 128 infra.
15. These provisions are, of course, completely inapplicable to real property held
as tenants by the entireties or as joint tenants.
16. § 9-105. This section, which also applies to distribution of leasehold estates,
will, along with § 7-401 (v), abolish the necessity of an "order to convey," which is
presently required by MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 156 (1964).
17. § 3-202. There would seem to be no doubt that the abolition of the inchoate
right of dower is constitutional. Thus, where the husband dies on or after January 1,
1970, the wife cannot save any claim to dower on the basis that the inchoate right has
been unconstitutionally abridged. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.31 (A. J.
Casner ed. 1952) ; Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1330 (1922).
18. Assuming the widow has signed all deeds to property in her husband's name
while he was alive, there could still have been a valid reason for electing dower instead
of an outright interest in the property. If the estate were insolvent, her dower in-
terest in the fee simple realty took priority over creditors' claims, whereas the
statutory share was, and is, computed on the net estate after deducting claims.
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of course, be in the administration of estates, but will be in the elimina-
tion of the necessity of requiring a spouse to sign deeds to fee simple
real estate owned by the other spouse.
Verifications Replace Affidavits
In recent years the General Assembly has done away with the
requirement of taking an oath or affirmation before a notary as to the
contents of various formal documents. For example, the requirement
of affidavits on corporate papers filed with the State Department of
Assessments and Taxation and in documents perfecting a security in-
terest in personal property has been eliminated. Similarly, with respect
to any paper required by new Article 93 to be verified, the following
representation will be sufficient:
I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury
that the contents of the foregoing document are true and correct
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.1 9
Orphans' Courts and Registers of Wills
No major changes have been made in the present statutory pro-
cedures and powers of the Orphans' Courts and the Registers of Wills."°
Thus, new Article 93 continues the system of utilizing the three judge
court (the members of which need not be and, with the exception of
Baltimore City, usually are not members of the Bar), the varied
methods of compensating the judges in different counties, the operation
of the offices of the Registers of Wills on a fee basis, the fixing of the
salaries of the Registers of Wills by the Board of Public Works,
the provision for mandatory approval by the Comptroller of the em-
ployment and compensation of all employees in the offices of the
Registers of Wills, and the like. The Report of the Governor's Com-
mission specifically states that the continuation of these rules does not
represent either approval or disapproval by the Commission.
Perhaps the major change from the viewpoint of the practicing
lawyer is the provision for maintenance of permanent records in the
Register's office. Wills, inventories, accounts, and reports of sale are
generally recorded in separate books. Often, in trying to determine
the facts concerning an estate, it is necessary to examine several
separate books. Under Section 2-210, the Registers will record wills
19. § 1-102. See also MD. ANN. COD art. 23, § 127B (Supp. 1968) ; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 95B, § 9-401 (1964) with respect to similar problems relating to corporate
papers and security interests.
20. A good description of American probate court systems may be found in Simes
& Basye The Organization of the Probate Court in America (pts. 1-2), 42 MIcH. L.
Rtv. 965, 43 id. 113 (1944) ; Atkinson, Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifica-
tions of Probate Judges (pts. 1-3), 23 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 93, 137, 183 (1939-1940).
See also P. Basye, The Venue of Probate and Administrative Proceedings, 43 MIcH.
L. Rev. 471 (1944). Those interested in pursuing further reform in this area should
consult Clark & Clark, Court Integration in Connecticut: A Case Study of Steps in
Judicial Reform, 59 YALE L.J. 1395, 1409-13 (1950).
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promptly after the probate. The other papers filed by the personal
representative will be held in a file in the Register's office and will not
be recorded until the estate has been closed. When the estate is closed,
all the papers will be recorded in chronological order in an "Adminis-
tration Proceedings" record book. This will greatly simplify the search-
ing of estate records.
Intestate Distribution, Family Allowances,
and Widow's Election
The order of intestate succession is substantially the same as the
present law.2 Degrees of relationship will be computed in accord-
ance with the civil law method instead of the common law method. 22
Children conceived by artificial insemination with the consent of the
husband shall be treated as the child of both the husband and wife.23
Rules relating to illegitimate children, 24 adopted children,25 and half-
bloods 26 have also been included. A statutory definition of per stirpes,2 7
consistent with the rule of Ballenger v. McMillan,23 has been provided.
The statute contains a provision dealing with advancements. 29 Family
allowances have been increased to the more realistic sums of $1,000.00
for the surviving spouse and $500.00 for each unmarried minor childY°
The right of a surviving spouse to elect his or her statutory share
must normally be exercised not later than thirty days after the expira-
tion of the time for filing creditors' claims, which is six months after the
date of first publication of notice to creditors, although the court does
have the power to extend the time. 31 If the election is made, all property
or other benefits which would have passed to the surviving spouse under
the will shall be treated as if the surviving spouse had died before the
execution of the will. Section 3-208(b) contains a specific arrange-
ment for the manner of contribution, on behalf of all other legatees, to
21. §§ 3-102 to 3-105.
22. § 1-203. Present Article 93 prescribes the common law method for certain
purposes and the civil law method for other purposes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93,
§§ 145, 152 (1964).
23. § 1-206(b). For those interested in pursuing the subject, see Hager, Artificial
Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L. Rrv.
217 (1961) ; Note, Artificial Insemination, 30 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 302 (1964).
24. §§ 1-206, 1-208. See also Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45 (1959);
Note, The Rights of Illegitimates under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. Rev. 337 (1962).
25. § 1-207. See also Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribu-
tion: A Comparative Study and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
152 (1966) ; Adopted Children as Members of a Class, SECOND REPORT oit Ntw YORK
TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON ESTATES, app. F. 221 (1963).
26. § 1-204. See also Comment, Statutory Treatment of Ancestral Estate and
the Half Blood in Intestate Succession, 42 YALE L.J. 101 (1932) ; Annot., 141 A.L.R.
976 (1942).
27. § 1-210. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 191 (1951) ; Page, Descent Per Stirpes
and Per Capita, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 3; White, Per Stirpes or Per Capita, 13 U. CIN.
L. Rv. 298 (1939).
28. 205 Md. 94, 106 A.2d 109 (1954).





the share of the surviving spouse.3 One change from the prior law on
this subject is that the spouse will no longer be entitled to a propor-
tionate interest, in kind, of each item of property in the estate." The
section now provides:
In lieu of contributing . . . an interest in specific property to such
intestate share a legatee may pay to the surviving spouse, in cash,
or other property acceptable to such spouse, an amount equal to
the fair market value of such interest in specific property on the
date the election to take an intestate share was made by the spouse.
No attempt has been made in the statute to change the judicially
developed rules which protect a widow against inter vivos transfers
made in fraud of her marital rights. 4
WILLS
In General
Few changes were made in the formal requirements for the execu-
tion of wills.35 There are no changes in the standard procedures for
execution.36  Two witnesses, with the same qualifications, are still
required. Any credible witness, not excluding a beneficiary of the
will, may serve. Holographic wills are still permitted where the testa-
tor is serving in the armed forces, but the permissible extent of
holographic wills has been somewhat limited. 8
32. See Note, Salvaging a Will after the Widow Renounces, 61 HARV. L. Rzv.
850 (1948).
33. The former rule was enunciated in Hall v. Elliott, 236 Md. 196, 202 A.2d
726 (1964).
34. See Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving
Spouses, 10 MD. L. RPv. 1 (1949); W. MACDONALD, FRAUD IN TE WIDOW'S SHARE
(1960).
35. The rules for execution of wills are contained in § 4-102. Cf. Mechem, Why
Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IOWA L. Rzv. 501, 502-03 (1948):
[The statute for execution of wills] is likewise obvious and familiar. It
assumes that the more "safeguards against fraud" the better. It is likewise
big-law-office philosophy: every testator must be forced to execute his will just
as it would be done if the matter were being handled by a high-powered law firm.
This overlooks one very important fact, namely, that the only persons the execu-
tion of whose wills are likely to come into question are precisely those persons
who do not have the job supervised by a high-powered law firm, but which
instead have the matter looked into by some very bad lawyer or by the local J.P.
or the local banker or the local real estate man or on the advice of those who
happen to be gathered at some lonely deathbed. These persons have the same
right to make wills as their more prosperous or sophisticated brothers and sisters
who employ good lawyers; the governing philosophy should be to design a wills
act that as far as is consistent with safety adapts itself to the knowledge (or
ignorance), psychology, and habits of such people so as to create the minimum
risk that their testamentary attempts will be frustrated by failure to have the
witnesses attest in the presence of the testator, or the like.
36. The rules for revocation of wills are substantially the same as in present
Article 93. See also Hoffman, Revocation of Wills and Related Subjects, 31 BROOKLYN
L. Rrv. 220 (1965) ; Note, Wills: Revocation by Subsequent Instrument, 17 OKLA. L.
Rev. 361 (1964).
37. A significant procedural change is that under most circumstances the witness
will not have to appear at the probate. § 5-303. See text discussion at note 82 infra.
38. See § 4-103.
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Nuncupative wills, on the other hand, have been abolished. Under
prior law, nuncupative wills by soldiers in the military service or "any
*mariner being at sea" were permitted. Whatever need for such wills
may have been formerly perceived, it has surely disappeared with the
development of the military practice under which inductees are en-
couraged to execute wills on forms provided by the Department of
Defense and with the technical advance and numerical decline of the
American merchant marine.
During the course of the deliberations of the Commission, it was
suggested that three witnesses should be required on wills. The theory
behind the suggestion was that because some states require three
witnesses, if a Maryland resident wants to dispose of real estate located
in one of those states, the disposition might be invalid unless three
witnesses were used. The Commission's research disclosed, however,
that the six states which do require three witnesses also have statutes
which expressly sanction the validity of a will validly made in another
state."9 Therefore, if a will with two witnesses is valid in Maryland,
it will be valid to dispose of real estate located in any other state even
though that other state normally requires three witnesses. The similar
Maryland statute, permitting a will executed out of Maryland to be
valid in Maryland if executed in conformity with the law of the testa-
tor's domicile, or the place where the will is executed, has been retained
in the new law.
40
Age
The age for making a testamentary disposition of personal prop-
erty was changed to eighteen, to make it the same as the age for testa-
mentary dispositions of real property.4' Maryland had always followed
the common law rule that twelve year old females and fourteen year
old males may dispose of personal property by will, whereas the age
requirement for real estate had been eighteen, regardless of sex. The
ages for testamentary disposition of personal property were among the
lowest in the United States. On the basis that there was little justifi-
cation for continuing the distinctions between males and females and
between real and personal property, a uniform age was provided.
A major objection to increasing the age to eighteen is the reduc-
tion in opportunity for sophisticated estate planning for twelve year
old females and fourteen year old males with substantial amounts of
property.42 Because the intestate death of a twelve year old female will
39. The states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, and Vermont. The statutes are CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-161 (1960);ME. REv. ST'rA. ANN. tit. 18, § 151 (1964) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 5 (1955)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:5 (1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-207 (1962); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 112 (1958). See also R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 196(1968) ; Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 905-07 (1960);
Ester & Scoles, Estate Planning and Conflict of Laws, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 270 (1963).
40. See § 4-104; MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 368 (1964).
41. See § 4-101.
42. The authors are grateful to George E. Thomsen, Esquire, of the Baltimore
Bar, a specialist on this subject, for his views on the matter.
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automatically result in all of her property passing to her parents, 43 if
they survive her, thereby increasing the size of the parents' estates,
it has, in the past, occasionally been useful to permit some twelve year
old females to execute wills leaving their property to brothers and
sisters rather than to parents.
Article 93 will now permit a post-mortem solution of this estate
planning problem. Under prior Maryland law, if the parents of an
intestate minor would succeed to the minor's property, the parents
probably could not, without making a taxable gift, renounce the testa-
mentary disposition 'in order to cause the property to go automatically
to the decedent's brothers and sisters. Section 9-101 specifically
provides that any heir or legatee44 may renounce his share of a testate
or intestate estate, whether realty or personalty, before title passes to
the heir or legatee. The renunciation may be partial or total. In this
way, the parents could renounce the legacy and do so without making
a gift for federal gift tax purposes.4 1 Under Section 4-404, the re-
nounced legacy would automatically pass to the other remaining in-
testate successors of the decedent. If the decedent had brothers and
sisters, the estate would automatically pass to them. Thus, notwith-
standing the increase in the age requirement for executing wills, the
premature death of a wealthy minor will not necessarily increase the
gross estate of either parent if they have other children and are willing
to renounce the minor's estate in favor of their surviving children.46
The statute makes no attempt to set forth the time within which the
parents must renounce. Since the renunciation will almost necessarily
be motivated by tax considerations, the renouncing parents will be
forced to comply with the standards set forth in the Treasury Regula-
tions: "[Renunciation] . . .does not constitute the making of a gift
if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after the transfer. 47
The new legislation also eliminates one other problem in the situa-
tion of an intestate minor's death. Where the minor's property would
43. This order of intestate distribution is set forth in § 3-104 and is the same
as the prior law.
44. "Heir" is defined in § 1-101 (e) as a person entitled to the property of an
intestate decedent. "Legatee" is defined in § 1-101 (j) as a person entitled to any real
or personal property under the terms of a will.
45. Where title passes directly to the person attempting to renounce, a taxable
gift results. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 836 (1952). § 1-301 provides that title to all property, whether real or personal,
in testacy or intestacy, passes directly to the personal representative; it does not pass
to the heir or legatee until a distribution is made.
46. See Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
641 (1933). See also Kay, Renunciations, Disclaimers and Releases, 35 TAX8S 767
(1957) ; Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 568 (1953) ;
Note, Disclaimer in Federal Taxation, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1047 (1950) ; Disclaimer of
Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions - Suggestions for a Model Act,
3 RIAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 131 (1968).
Renunciation is also important because of the amendments recently made to
IN'. Rtv. ConE of 1954, § 2056(d), which now permits beneficiaries to alter the
application of the estate tax marital deduction by certain disclaimers.
47. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(c) (1961). See also Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 1, at 29, which states that the Internal Revenue Service will not issue
rulings as to whether a proposed renunciation is unequivocal and made within a
reasonable time.
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devolve upon his brothers or sisters, the appointment of a guardian
would have been required under prior law if the brothers or sisters
were also minors. Under new Article 93, the personal representative
has the power, with the approval of the court, to designate a custodian
under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and to transfer to the custodian
any property distributable to a minor. Although the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act was amended in 1967 to provide for testamentary dis-
positions to minors by use of the Act,4 the 1967 amendments required
specific reference in the will to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act for
the custodial arrangement to be available. Section 9-109(c) affords
the personal representative the opportunity to use the custodial arrange-
ment of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act even though the will does
not mention that Act, if such an arrangement is appropriate under
the circumstances, which it would normally be, and the court, accord-
ingly, approves.4 9
Incorporation by Reference
A major procedural innovation, which should appeal to many
lawyers and laymen, is Section 4-107 of new Article 93. This section
codifies the common law rule permitting wills or trust instruments to
incorporate the terms of any writing which is in existence when the
will or trust instrument is executed. As an example of such an in-
corporated writing, the statute refers to a statement of administrative
provisions or fiduciary powers which may be recorded in any record
office. The intent of the legislation is to afford lawyers the opportunity
to eliminate long recitations of administrative provisions and fiduciary
powers in wills, particularly those establishing trusts, and in inter vivos
trust instruments. Under this provision, a lawyer with a standard set
of administrative provisions and fiduciary powers may record those
powers in any record office in Maryland and then simply insert in his
wills and trust instruments the statement that the testator or grantor
"gives to his executors and trustees all the powers set forth in the
declaration of powers recorded among the Land Records of Caroline
County, Maryland, in Liber JWS 1969, folio 1798." It would be appro-
priate for the lawyer to duplicate these powers so that copies can be
delivered to the client when he reviews his proposed will or trust. Use
of this system will avoid the necessity to retype "boiler-plate" clauses
in each instance with the concomitant worries of proofreading, bulging
files, and client irritation at the length of a will sometimes thought to
have been padded to increase the size of the fee."
48. MD. ANN. CoDn art. 16, § 214(a) (Supp. 1968), superseded by ch. 4, § 1,
[1969] Md. Laws 122 (§ 302(a) of new Article 93A).
49. Even if this latest amendment had not been made, and a guardian were
required to be appointed, the guardianship procedure set forth in new Article 93A
will, as pointed out later in this article, be simpler than that under prior law and will
not involve the peculiar technicalities and expense that have customarily been asso-
ciated with guardianships.
50. See also Administrative Clauses: Incorporation by Reference, 2 RIAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 524 (1967); "Automated" Drafting Techniques, 3 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 475 (1968) ; Evans, Non-Testamentary Acts and Incorporation by
Reference. 16 U. CxI. L. Rv. 635 (1949).
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With the ease of this device goes the added and quite serious
responsibility of being certain that the incorporated powers fit the par-
ticular situation. This will be especially true where trusts require
under federal tax law the availability of the marital deduction, the
deductibility of a charitable remainder, or a gift of a present interest
for the purposes of the annual gift tax exclusion. In these instances, it
will be necessary to limit the scope of certain powers in the "boiler-
plate" and to substitute other powers."'
Exercise of Power of Appointment
Section 359 of old Article 93 contains a presumption that a
general power of appointment held by a testate decedent is exercised
by the residuary clause of his will. The statute is limited to "general"
powers of appointment. Section 4-407 changes the rule. It eliminates
any reference to "general" power of appointment - a term which has
been productive of an immense amount of controversy and litigation
in Maryland.52 It also provides that a residuary clause will auto-
matically exercise any power of appointment if an intent to exercise
the power is expressly indicated in the will, or if the instrument creat-
ing the power fails to provide for the disposition of the property
subject to the power if the power is not exercised. A residuary clause
will be deemed "expressly" to exercise the power if it contains lan-
guage such as "all the rest of my estate and property, including all
property over which I may have any power of appointment, I give
to. . . ." It will not be necessary to mention the specific instrument
which granted the power unless, of course, the donor of the power
requires specific reference to that instrument.
In Terrorem Clause
New Article 93 contains the first Maryland statutory rule with
respect to an in terrorem clause.5 3 The section reflects the common
law rule of the old Maryland cases.54 It provides that "A provision
in the will purporting to penalize any interested person for contesting
the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is void
if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings." 5' The concept of
probable cause in this type of proceeding is reflected in a substantial
body of case law which has grown up throughout the country.
51. See Tax Traps in Administrative Powers of Trustees, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TRUST J. 305 (1968).
52. The most recent cases dealing with "general" powers are Guiney v. United
States, 295 F. Supp. 789 (D. Md. 1969) and Frank v. Frank, No. 219, Sept. Term
1968 (Md. Ct. App., filed May 7, 1969). In the Guiney case "general" power of
appointment is defined from a tax point of view, a definition not determinative of the
relevance of the present MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 359 (1964).
53. § 4-413. See Jack, No-Contest or In Terrorem Clauses in Wills - Construc-
tion and Enforcement, 19 Sw. L.J. 722 (1965) ; Selvin, Comment: Terror in Probate,
16 STAN. L. Rzv. 355 (1963).
54. See E. MILLER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MARYLAND § 310 (1927).
55. § 3-104.
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Lapsed Legacies
An anti-lapse statute is contained in Section 4-403. The only
change from the prior anti-lapse statute is that under the former statute,
a lapsed legacy passed directly to the heirs of the deceased legatee,
even though the legatee might himself have left a will. Thus, if A, a
legatee under the will of B, died before B but after the execution of
B's will, the property passed outright to A's heirs at law. This was
true even though A's will left his estate in trust for the benefit of his
heirs, or to his heirs but in different proportions than the statute of
intestate succession provides, or even to other persons.
Section 4-403 expressly provides that the lapsed legacy shall pass
directly to those persons who would have taken the property if the
legatee had died owning the property. If the legatee dies testate, the
legacy will pass under his will. As under prior law, the lapsed legacy
will not be subject to administration in the estate of the deceased legatee.
Void, Inoperative, or Renounced Legacies
Section 4-404 contains the first Maryland statutory provision for
the disposition of void, inoperative, and renounced legacies. Assume
that A executes a will providing: "I give $10,000 to B." If B is dead
when the will is executed, the legacy is considered to be void. If B is
alive when the will is executed but dies before the testator, the legacy
would be a lapsed legacy, to be saved by the anti-lapse statute. Assume,
however, that A's will provides: "I give $10,000 to B, if B survives
me." If B dies after the execution of the will but before the testator,
the legacy would be an inoperative legacy and would not be saved
under the anti-lapse statute because the testator expressly provided
that the legacy would take effect only if B survived A.
The common law rule in Maryland was that real estate which
was the subject of a void or inoperative legacy passed directly to the
heirs of the testator, unless the will otherwise provided.56 On the
other hand, personal property which was the subject of a void or in-
operative legacy passed under the residuary clause in the will.17 This
distinction, as artificial as most of the common law distinctions between
real and personal property, has now been dropped. Under Section
4-404 any property which is the subject of a void or inoperative gift
will automatically pass as part of the residue of the estate. The same
rule is set forth in Section 4-404 with respect to the disposition of
renounced gifts.
Requirement that Heirs and Legatees Survive
for Thirty Days
Sections 3-110 and 4-401 of new Article 93 contain a presump-
tion that certain heirs or legatees who fail to survive the testator by
thirty days shall be deemed to have predeceased the testator, unless
the will provides otherwise. In intestacy, the statutory provision
56. See E. MILLER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MARYLAND § 159 (1927).
57. Id. at § 160.
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relates only to descendants, ancestors, brothers, sisters, or descendants
of brothers or sisters. If any person in any of these categories fails
to survive, his descendants will automatically take the share of the
person who is presumed to have predeceased the intestate decedent. 8
The effect of both of these provisions will be to eliminate double
administration of the same property where the second decedent dies
within thirty days of the first decedent.
Section 4-401, dealing with testate administration, is not appli-
cable to a surviving spouse because of the possible loss of the federal
estate tax marital deduction which might result if the statute presumed
that a widow who did not survive for thirty days predeceased her
husband. The Report of the Governor's Commission gives several
examples of the operation of Section 4-401 on typical legacies con-
tained in a will:
1. "To A, if A survives the testator." Under this type of bequest,
A will have to survive the testator by at least thirty full days in order
to take the legacy. If A fails to survive by at least thirty days he is
presumed to have predeceased the testator, the condition of the legacy
has not been met, the legacy becomes completely inoperative, and the
anti-lapse statute does not apply.
2. "To A, if A survives the testator by five days or more." Under
this type of provision, if A survives the testator by five days or more
but not by thirty days, A will be entitled to the legacy.
3. "To A, if A survives the testator, but if it cannot be deter-
mined whether A survives the testator, A shall be presumed to have
survived the testator." Under this provision, A would take the legacy
if he survives the testator.
4. "To A." Under this provision, if A survives the testator by
less than thirty days, A will be deemed to have predeceased the testator,
but the provisions of the anti-lapse statute will save the legacy.
New Article 93 limits the applicability of the Uniform Simultane-
ous Death Act as it relates to the distribution of estates. The Uniform
Act, which provides that in case of simultaneous deaths the legatee
shall be presumed to have predeceased the testator unless the will con-
tains a provision to the contrary,59 will continue to be important in
the case of distributions to a decedent's spouse, to which the thirty
day rule of Section 4-401 is not applicable. With this exception, if
the will contains no contrary provision, the results in Examples 1
and 4 will apply.
Miscellaneous Rules Involving Wills, Trusts
and Future Interests
Many familiar rules are continued in new Article 93: provisions
with respect to depositing wills for safekeeping in the Registers' offices
58. § 3-104(b).
59. See MD. ANN. COMe art. 35, §§ 83-90 (1965).
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during the testator's lifetime,6" the rule against perpetuities, 61 the
construction of phrases such as "die without issue, ' 6 2 statutory sanc-
tion for pour-overs to inter vivos trusts 63 and testamentary trusts,
6 4
the indestructibility of contingent remainders,65 the abolition of the
Rule in Shelley's Case, 6 the 1964 statute authorizing payment of death
benefits (such as insurance proceeds) to inter vivos and testamentary
trusts,67 the 1967 statute with respect to the non-tax effect of elections
to deduct administration expenses on the fiduciary income tax return
instead of on the estate tax return,68 a procedure, which has been sim-
plified, for releasing powers of appointment,6 9 and the Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act.70
One change in the rules for construction of wills which has not
already been mentioned is contained in Section 11-107.71 Revenue
Procedure 64-19 72 authorized one of two procedures acceptable to the
Internal Revenue Service for use in satisfying a pecuniary marital
deduction bequest where the personal representative could make dis-
tribution by valuing assets at their federal estate tax values. In 1965,
the General Assembly enacted Section 392 of Article 93,73 which pre-
scribed that one of the two permitted procedures would be applicable
unless the will directed the use of the other procedure. Section 11-107
in new Article 93 adopts the other procedure as the norm. The report
60. § 4-201.
61. §§ 4-409, 11-102, 11-103. The statute does not deal with Professor Leach's
musings on the suggestions for a sperm bank to recreate mankind after the atomic
holocaust. Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942 (1962). Nor does the statute deal with ectogenesis (test
tube birth and the artificial womb) and other medical insights. See Rorvik, Making
Man and Woman Without Men and Women, ESQUIRE, April, 1969, at 108.
§ 11-102(b) repeals the present statutory exception in MD. ANN. CODE art. 93,§ 348 (1964) to the Maryland rule against perpetuities, which permitted shifting
executory legacies from a charity to an individual. Maryland was apparently unique
in permitting such a shifting legacy. See 6 AMRIcAN LAW OV PROPERTY § 24.39
(A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
The elimination of this exception was part of a consistent philosophy of the
1969 General Assembly which also seriously curtailed the exemption from the Rule
Against Perpetuities which has always been enjoyed by possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry. See Ch. 5, [1969] Md. Laws 135, which adds §§ 143-146 to Article 21
of the Maryland Code, and was the product of a special Legislative Council Com-
mittee on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry. See 2 LEGISLAT vE COUNCIL
OF MARYLAND, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OV 1969, SPECIAL CoMMIrTEE
REPORTS 481.
62. § 4-410.
63. § 4-411. See also Flickinger, The "Pour-Over" Trust and the Wills Statutes:








71. An error of oversight may be observed in the effective date provision govern-
ing § 11-107, which is set forth in § 12-102(i), and which provides that it shall apply
to the estates of all decedents dying on or after July 1, 1969. When the effective date
of the entire statute was changed by Senate amendment to January 1, 1970, § 12-102(i)
was inadvertently missed.
72. 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682.
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 392 (Supp. 1968).
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of the Governor's Commission states that the newly adopted procedure
is much less complicated. Basically, the distinction between the two
procedures is this: under the former procedure, the executor was re-
quired to distribute in satisfaction of the marital bequest assets fairly
representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property
available for distribution; under the new procedure, the executor must
distribute assets having an aggregate fair market value at the date or
dates of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of the marital
bequest as finally determined in the federal estate tax proceedings.
The former method was not only more difficult to administer,
but in the situation where the value of the estate did increase during
administration, its effect was to give the surviving spouse a share of
the appreciation and thereby to increase her gross estate. Under the
new procedure, the surviving spouse will not share in any such appre-
ciation. If the estate had decreased in value, the former procedure
would have been more satisfactory. Mr. Richard B. Covey, who has
written the leading exposition of Revenue Procedure 64-19, concludes:
Obviously, there is no way of knowing with certainty what will
happen to the value of a decedent's estate during the period of
administration. However, this is not to say that it is impossible
to form a judgment as to which provision best achieves the de-
sired result in the "average" case. . . . Thus, on balance, the
[new] provision is preferable in attempting to minimize the
estate taxes upon the widow's death.74
OPENING THE ESTATE
Subtitle V of the new Article 93 sets forth the procedures for
opening an estate. Two new terms are used in this Subtitle, but the
terms reflect traditional Maryland practices. The terms are "adminis-
trative probate"7 5 and "judicial probate."76 In a general way, adminis-
trative probate refers to the granting of probate and the appointment
of a personal representative by the Register of Wills, without the
necessity of formal application to the Orphans' Court. "Judicial pro-
bate" refers to a court action in probating the will or appointing the
personal representative.
The Maryland probate procedure has not been consistent. In
most of the jurisdictions, the Register admits the will to probate and
causes the personal representative to be appointed without the necessity
of any appearance before the Orphans' Court, if the court is not then
in session. This has led to a widespread practice of purposely offering
wills for probate during those hours when the Orphans' Courts are not
in session. On the other hand, some Registers have refused to accept
wills for probate except upon presentation to the Orphans' Court when-
ever it goes into session.
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The theory of the new legislation is that in most situations the
Register should be responsible enough to admit wills to probate and
to appoint personal representatives whether or not the Orphans' Court
is in session. Nevertheless, there are several situations in which the
court must assume jurisdiction: (a) at the request of any "interested
person,"77 (b) at the request of a creditor in the event no one has
applied for probate, (c) if it appears to the court or the Register that
the petition for administrative probate is materially incomplete or in-
correct in any respect, (d) if the will has been torn, mutilated, burned
in part, or marked in any way so as to make a significant change in
the meaning of the will, or (e) if it is alleged that the will is lost
or destroyed. 78
If administrative probate has been commenced, and the Register
has granted probate and appointed the personal representative, any
"interested person" may, within four months, insist on judicial pro-
bate. 79 All actions taken pursuant to the administrative probate are
valid until the determinations at the hearing for judicial probate have
been made.80 The only exceptions to the four month rule deal with
special circumstances. For example, if the proponent of a later offered
will, in spite of the exercise of reasonable diligence and efforts to locate
the will, was actually unaware of the will's existence at the time of the
administrative probate, or if the notices to be sent by the Register of
Wills to all interested persons were not given, or if there was fraud,
a material mistake, or substantial irregularity in the administrative
probate proceeding, any "interested person" may, within eighteen
months of the decedent's death, institute a proceeding for judicial
probate."' In the ordinary situation, however, whether the Orphans'
Court is in session or not, the Register will be able to handle the entire
situation without judicial blessing.
Elimination of Examination of Witnesses to the Will
One procedural innovation relates to the examination of witnesses
in administrative probate. It will no longer be necessary to bring wit-
nesses to the Register's office, (1) if the will appears to have been
duly executed and contains a recital by attesting witnesses of facts
constituting due execution, or (2) upon the filing of a statement
executed under penalty of perjury by a person with personal knowledge
of the circumstances of execution, stating that the persons whose names
appear on the will were, in fact, the attesting witnesses.8 2
However, if any "interested person" wants to have the witnesses
produced and examined, he has the right, within four months after
77. § 5-402. The concept of "interested person" is discussed in the text at
note 84 infra.
78. On the subject of lost or destroyed wills, see Note, Rebutting The Presump-
tion of Revocation of Lost or Destroyed Wills, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 105 (1938) ; Evans,






the grant of administrative probate, to insist upon judicial probate, in
which event the court will summon the witnesses. All "interested
persons" must necessarily receive notice of the administrative probate
and be afforded those constitutionally required procedures enabling
them to challenge the asserted execution of the will.
This provision is grounded on the assumption that often no con-
troversy exists concerning the proper execution of the will and it is
unfair to impose the frequently onerous burden of finding the witnesses
and dragging them to the Register of Wills' office for an essentially
perfunctory undertaking. Where there is going to be a controversy,
one need only ask for examination of the witnesses and the request
must be granted.
Petition for Probate
New Article 93 contains a statutory form of "Petition for Pro-
bate." 3  The petition combines most of the information presently
contained in the various petitions for letters testamentary and for
letters of administration commonly used or deemed "official" in the
different counties, and in the list of names and addresses of legatees
under the will. The major changes are: (i) the names and addresses
of all "interested persons" must now be set forth directly in the petition,
and (ii) the petition need not contain any recitation of the approxi-
mate value of the estate or the debts of the estate.
"Interested person" is defined in Section 1-101 (f) to include not
only the beneficiaries named in a will, referred to in the statute as
"legatees," '5 4 but also the heirs of the decedent even if he died testate.
The statute recognizes that the intestate successors, whether or not
they are named in the will, should be given notice of all of the pro-
ceedings so that they can be afforded an opportunity to attack the
validity of the will. Under current Maryland practice, there is no
procedure for giving notice to disinherited heirs, and there is a distinct
possibility that an heir who, under current practice, receives no notice
may be entitled to attack for want of constitutional due process the
validity of all proceedings taken without his knowledge.
The old requirement of stating in a petition for letters the ap-
proximate value of -the estate presumably was initiated in order to
enable the Registers to set the amount of the bond.8 5 As a practical
83. § 5-206. This is one of seven statutory forms, the use of which is intended
to make probate procedure uniform throughout the state. The others are: Notice of
Request for Judicial Probate [§ 5-403(b)] ; Bond [§ 6-102(f)] ; Letters of Adminis-
tration [§ 6-104] - which is to be used for both testate and intestate administrations;
Notice of Appointment of Personal Representative [§ 7-103] - which is a combined
notice to creditors warning them to file their claims and a notice to those otherwise
interested in the administration who have any objection to the probate or appointment
proceeding to file their objections; Spouse's Election to Take Against Will [§ 3-207]
and Creditor's Claim against Decedent's Estates [§ 8-104(b)].
84. If there is a trust created under the will, the term "legatee" refers only to
the trustees of the trust and not to the beneficiaries.
85. Bonds will continue to be required even where the will excuses bond.
§ 6-10 2 (a). In this situation, the penal sum will only be an amount sufficient to
secure the payment of debts, Maryland inheritance taxes payable by the personal
representative, and taxes on commission. Id. Even where the will does not excuse
bond, if all interested persons consent, the amount of the bond can be limited to the
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matter, reliance on this figure has proved to most Registers to be no
better placed than reliance on oral representations made by the per-
sonal representative as to the approximate value of the estate. In any
event the Registers set bond based at best on an estimate and check
its accuracy and adequacy when the inventories are filed, calling for
an increase in the penalty if the original estimate was low. The new
form, therefore, reflects the fact that the person applying for letters is
often unable to value the estate at the commencement of the proceeding.
Since, even under the present law, petitions are filed under penalty
of perjury, many personal representatives have been reluctant to set
any meaningful value in the petition, resorting to a statement such
as "over $50,000," even where it could reasonably be anticipated that
the amount of the estate would reach $250,000. As is presently the
case, when the inventory is filed, within ninety days after the appoint-
ment of the personal representative, the bond may be increased to reflect
the inventoried values.
Notice to Legatees and Heirs
Although a major accomplishment of new Article 93 is the elimi-
nation of much unnecessary paperwork, particularly in uncomplicated
and uncontested administrations, an important additional requirement
which has been imposed is the strict procedure for notifying interested
persons of various events during the course of administration.
At the outset of administration, the petitioner for letters must
list in his petition the names and addresses of everyone he thinks
may be an "interested person."' As has been previously indicated,
this requirement includes not only everyone named in the will then
being offered for probate, but also any heirs not named in the will.
Then, as the first step after the grant of letters and probate of
the will, if any, the personal representative must prepare and have
published in a local newspaper a notice of his appointment.87  The
publication of this notice is now mandatory, rather than discretionary,
but the new statute requires only three insertions instead of four. This
notice, the form of which is set forth in Section 7-103, combines both
the traditional notice to creditors with notice to anyone who may
abject to the personal representative's appointment or to the probate of
the will that he must make his objection within six months of the
first insertion."8
The next step in the giving of formal notice of the proceedings
must be taken within fifteen days after the appointment of the per-
sonal representative, when he must deliver two things to the Register
same amount that would have been required if the will had excused bond. The latter
procedure is new and will save bond premiums chiefly in intestate estates where all in-
terested parties desire to reduce the bond as much as possible. Most wills excuse bond.
86. §§ 5-201(f), 5-206.
87. § 7-103.
88. It should be noted that the limitations period of 6 months from the date of
first publication stated in the notice, within which objections to the personal repre-
sentative's appointment or to the probate of the decedent's will must be filed, does not
relate to a mere request for judicial probate, as to which the period of limitations is
4 months from the date of administrative probate. § 5-304(a).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of Wills: (1) the text of the first published newspaper notice, which
may be in the form of a reproduction of the printed newspaper item,
the better choice, or may be in the form of a copy of the typewritten
notice delivered to the paper for publication; and (2) a separate list
containing the names and addresses of the legatees, and heirs who may
not be legatees, which list must be furnished even though some or all
of the names previously appeared as a part of the petition for probate. 9
When the Register receives the text of the newspaper notice and
the list of heirs and legatees, he is required, within five days, to for-
ward to each person on the list, by delivery or by certified mail, a copy
of the text of the newspaper notice. 9° It is the personal representa-
tive's duty to supply the Register with enough copies of the text of
the notice so that there is one copy for each person named on the list.
Finally, after the notice has been published three times, the personal
representative must file a certificate of publication.9
The Governor's Commission concluded that these procedures were
necessary to assure compliance with the due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, as set forth
in the Supreme Court decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co.9" When judicial probate has been requested, there are
further requirements of publication and other notice.9
Ancillary Administration
The requirement that a foreign personal representative take out
ancillary letters has been eliminated. 4 The Maryland law has never
been particularly clear with respect to the circumstances under which
ancillary letters were required to be obtained. The requirement that
a foreign personal representative take out letters in Maryland was
generally based on four theories: (1) foreign personal representatives
have no power to sue or otherwise to act in Maryland without first
obtaining authority from a Maryland court; (2) local creditors will
be protected by being afforded an opportunity to file claims against
the Maryland estate when the Maryland letters are obtained; (3)
letters should be obtained to enable the foreign personal representative
to deal with Maryland real estate, and (4) letters should be obtained
to afford the Maryland taxing authorities a better opportunity to collect




92. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Mullane test for the reasonableness of notice is
that the form of notice used must not be substantially less likely to give actual
notice than other available practicable methods. For an analysis of Mullane see Note,
Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(3) - The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. Rev. 139,
143-45 (1969). See also Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The
Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. Ruv. 420.
93. § 5-403.
94. § 5-501.
95. See discussion in Foreign Executors and the Need for Ancillary Administra-
tion, 1 MD. BAR J., April, 1969, at 24. See also Currie, The Multiple Personality of
the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHi. L. Rtv.
429 (1966) ; Alford, Collecting a Decedent's Assets Without Ancillary Administra-
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As the report of the Governor's Commission points out, the
Maryland practice has not been notably successful in providing the
protection these theories were originally supposed to afford. The rule
prohibiting a foreign personal representative from instituting suit in
Maryland has easily been avoided by equitable assignments of claims.
The protection of local creditors worked imperfectly because local
creditors were often unaware of an ancillary administration in Mary-
land or else the rules requiring ancillary administration in Maryland
were so ambiguous that foreign personal representatives simply did
not bother to take out letters, absent some compelling reason. The
so-called "protection" for creditors also involved a hardship on Mary-
land debtors. Under the doctrine of Citizens National Bank v. Sharp,96
a Maryland debtor who paid the foreign personal representative of his
deceased creditor did so at his peril because, if an ancillary adminis-
trator had been appointed in Maryland, the Maryland debtor might
also be liable to pay the Maryland administrator. The sanctity of real
estate titles was, in many instances, perverted because Article 21,
Section 9597 permitted foreign personal representatives to sell Mary-
land realty without obtaining Maryland letters. The tax situation was
anomalous because the Maryland Code set forth no rules for determin-
ing whether the foreign personal representative was required to take
out letters in Maryland.
The Governor's Commission felt that the most desirable method
of handling these problems would be the establishment of a simple
statutory pattern duly protective of (1) Maryland creditors, including
the tax authorities, if the decedent owned real or leasehold property in
Maryland, and (2) Maryland debtors of non-resident decedents, and
which would at the same time insure full disclosure in the land records.
Section 5-501 of new Article 93 states that "a foreign personal repre-
sentative shall not be required to take out letters in Maryland for any
purpose." Section 5-502 sets forth the rule that: "Any foreign personal
representative may exercise in Maryland all powers of his office, and
may sue and be sued in Maryland, subject to any statute or rule relat-
ing to non-residents." Section 5-503 provides that a foreign personal
representative owning real or leasehold property must publish a news-
paper notice in every county in which the property is located setting
forth certain information with respect to the estate, including the name
of a Maryland agent for service of process on file with the Register
and the location of the property. The creditors in Maryland may,
within six months, file claims against the Maryland property in a
special record book for claims against non-resident decedents.
Because there is no formal administration in Maryland, a pro-
cedure has been included in Section 5-504 for fixing the Maryland
inheritance tax. If the inheritance tax is not paid in accordance with
this procedure, the unpaid tax obligation constitutes a lien against the
property. Similarly, an unpaid claim, evidence of which has been filed
tion, 18 Sw. L.J. 329 (1964); B. McDOWLL, FOREIGN PRSONAL RUPRStNTATIVES
(1957).
96. 53 Md. 521 (1880).
97. MD. ANN. CoD art. 21, § 95 (1966).
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by the creditor, will also constitute a lien. If the property is sold, the
lien of the creditor is transferred to the property even if it is sold,
unless the taxes have been paid. The clarity of the lien provisions
should force foreign personal representatives to pay Maryland taxes
at the peril of being unable to pass clear title to property.
Persons Entitled to Be Personal Representatives
There are only two significant changes in this area. First, no
judge of any state court or federal court and no Register of Wills or
clerk of court may serve as a personal representative unless he is a
surviving spouse or is related to the decedent within the third degree."8
A similar provision has been added to Article 16 with respect to
judges, clerks ,and registers serving as trustees. 9 Second, non-resi-
dents of Maryland can serve as personal representatives whether or
not the domiciliary state of the non-resident has a statute providing
for reciprocity with Maryland, so long as the non-resident files with
the Register an irrevocable designation of a Maryland agent on whom
service of process can be made.' The present law generally thwarts
a testator's intentions. It does so with particular unfairness if his will
was executed when the personal representative was eligible to serve
but the personal representative later moved to another state before the
testator's death. Even though the personal representative might have
been the only child of the decedent, he could not qualify if he lived in
West Virginia or some other non-reciprocal state.
Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions with Respect
to Personal Representatives
New Article 93 sets forth the rule that successor personal repre-
sentatives and surviving co-personal representatives shall, unless other-
wise provided in the will, have all the powers that the original personal
representatives possessed.' Section 6-203 states that where there are
two or more personal representatives, the vote taken on any act must
be unanimous except (i) where the act involved is receiving or receipt-
ing for property due the estate, (ii) where all personal representatives
cannot readily be consulted in the time reasonably available for emer-
gency action, (iii) where there has been a valid delegation to a co-
personal representative, or (iv) where the will or any statute provides
otherwise. An example of a statute that contains a contrary specific rule
is Section 44 of Article 23 of the Maryland Code0 2 which provides for
majority vote by fiduciary holders of stock in a Maryland corporation.
Subtitle VI of the new statute also sets forth detailed require-
ments for suspending the powers of a personal representative on the
application of any interested person and for the termination of the
98. § 5-104(b) (5).
99. § 199A of Article 16, enacted in ch. 3, § 5, [1969] Md. Laws 103.
100. § 5-104(b) (6).
101. §§ 6-202, 6-204.
102. MD. ANN. CODe art. 23, § 44 (1966).
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rights of a personal representative by death, disability, resignation or
removal.' Finally, Subtitle VI eliminates the need for the miscellany
of the ecclesiastical latin special administrations that abound in
Article 93, such as letters ad colligendum, letters durante minoritate,
letters de bonis non, and letters pendente lite. Wherever there is a
special circumstance that requires a special administrator, such as dur-
ing an interim period when a personal representative has died, the
court may appoint "a special administrator" to act until a new per-
sonal representative has been appointed.
10 4
Administration of the Estate
Subtitle VII of new Article 93 deals with the procedures which
the personal representative must follow in administering the estate.
One of the most important provisions, not only in Subtitle VII but
in the entire statute, is contained in Section 7-401. The first sentence
of this Section reads as follows: "The personal representative, in the
performance of his duties pursuant to Section 7-101, may exercise
any power or authority conferred upon him in the will, without appli-
cation to, the approval of, or ratification by the Court." Thus, if the
will confers sufficiently broad authority on the personal representative,
he may go about the business of administering the estate without
obtaining orders from the court. This eliminates the archaic law and
practice of taking up the Orphans' Court's time with petitions and
orders that do no more than recite and seek approval for actions
which an executor has authority to do anyway - actions which even
the court's approval cannot shield against subsequent attack by a bene-
ficiary if the executor took them in violation of his basic fiduciary duties.
The theory of Section 7-401 is that so long as the will confers
broad authority on the personal representative, he should be permitted
to act in the same manner and with the same responsibility as the
trustee of a Maryland trust - without application to, approval of,
or ratification by any court, unless, of course, he or any interested
person requests judicial review or sanction. The procedural rigmarole
can presently be avoided by creating a revocable inter vivos trust, but
such a trust is generally thought to be beyond the means or the under-
standing of persons of moderate or limited means. The new law gives
to everyone the advantages of the revocable inter vivos trust without
the necessity of creating such a trust.
Under the new law, if the personal representative is given the
power of sale in the will, as he generally is, he may sell real estate or
any other type of property without giving notice by publication and
without obtaining any order of court or formal ratification of the
sale.'05 If the exercise of the power was in any way improper, the per-
sonal representative, pursuant to Section 7-403, will be liable for breach
of his duty to interested persons in the amount of any resulting damage.
103. §§ 6-301, 6-304 to 6-306.
i04. §§ 6-401 to 6-404.
105. See § 7-401.
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Section 7-404 gives full protection to persons dealing with the personal
representative, such as a purchaser of real estate. It provides:
In the absence of actual knowledge or of reasonable cause to in-
quire as to whether the personal representative is improperly
exercising his power, a person dealing with the personal repre-
sentative is not bound to inquire whether the personal representa-
tive is properly exercising his power, and is protected as if the
personal representative properly exercised the power. A person is
not bound to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or
delivered to a personal representative.
This rule is substantially the same as the rule with respect to purchasers
from a private trustee, and should cause no problems with respect to
rights of purchasers, title insurance, and the other accoutrement of
real estate transactions.
However, a personal representative may petition the court for
permission to act in any manner relating to the administration of the
estate. 106 This provision is simply intended to allow the personal repre-
sentative to initiate a proceeding whenever he deems it necessary to
secure some formal resolution of a question relating to the administra-
tion. Likewise, any other interested person may petition the court with
respect to any such question. 0 7
As has been previously indicated, obtaining a court order will not
exculpate the personal representative from all liability for the action
taken pursuant to that order. The order is not a professional liability
insurance policy. An imprudent fiduciary investment, although author-
ized by the court, may still be subject to surcharge. Although this
may surprise some lawyers, and, indeed, some judges, it has been
the Maryland law for a long time and has not been changed by the
new statute.'0 s
Even if a personal representative has obtained an order authoriz-
ing a particular action, that order will not insulate him from liability
if he was negligent in choosing the course of action authorized by the
order, or if he acted in bad faith in obtaining it. The key determina-
tion is whether such action was prudent at the time it was taken, and
the fact that an executor has obtained an order from the Orphans'
Court has no legal bearing on that determination. The fail-safe course
for any executor to follow where, for example, he is selling property
the value of which is seriously debatable, would be to notify all of the
interested persons that he proposes to take such action and to get their
consent to the price at which he is selling the property. In that way,
he should be able to insulate himself from liability to those interested
persons, as long as he has not withheld material information from
them. Of course, regardless of whether or not the beneficiaries suc-
106. § 7-402.
107. § 2-102. See also MD. ANN. CODt art 31A, § 4 (1967), the uniform declara-
tory judgment proceedings in the Orphans' Courts and other courts of record.
108. See Executor Not Always Protected, 1 Mo. BAR J., Jan., 1969, at 24;
Goldsborough v. DeWitt, 171 Md. 225, 189 A. 226 (1937) ; Zimmerman v. Coblentz,
170 Md. 468, 185 A. 342 (1936).
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ceed in an action against the personal representative for selling the
property at an inadequate price, a good faith purchaser of the property
is protected under Section 7-404."19
While the bill containing new Article 93 was before the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee, many Registers of Wills and some
members of the Bar expressed great concern over the provisions of the
proposed Section 7-402, relating to "extended powers."' This pro-
vision was deleted; the deletion will impose additional duties on
personal representatives of intestate decedents or decedents whose wills
do not include certain broad powers of administration. Unfortunately,
it is the small-to-medium-sized estates that are most likely to be affected
by this move. The heart of the concept of "extended powers" was to
enable the testator by his will, or all persons interested in the estate,
regardless of the will, to agree in writing, after the decedent's death,
to permit the personal representative to sell property or invest in prop-
erty or do anything else necessary or appropriate to administer the
estate without application to, approval of, or ratification by the court.
Thus, if a man died intestate, survived by his wife and two children,
the three of them could execute and file with the Register a written
document authorizing the personal representative to buy or sell estate
assets or do anything else without getting court approval. So too, if
a decedent's will contained no express prohibition but contained an
abbreviated set of powers, all the beneficiaries could similarly agree.
Since all interested persons would have to agree to this procedure, it
is difficult to rationalize the elimination of this aspect of "extended
powers" on any basis other than its novelty.
One other aspect of "extended powers" would have enabled in-
ventories and accounts to be delivered by the personal representative
to all interested persons in lieu of filing them with the court. If this
procedure were adopted, the personal representative could, instead, file
with the court a verified certificate stating that a copy of accounts and
inventories had been mailed to each interested person. This provision
was intended to enable a man's financial affairs to be maintained in
family privacy rather than spread upon the public records. All other
financial affairs are private: income tax returns and estate tax returns
must be kept confidential by both federal and state authorities. It seems
anomalous that this one aspect of his affairs - the content and value
of his probate property - must be laid out for the curious public to
observe. The procedure suggested by the Governor's Commission
would, at the election of the decedent by will while he was alive, or,
after his death at the election of all interested persons, have enabled
these affairs to retain the confidential status previously allowed to
other financial records.
If a will does not contain a long recital of authorized powers, or
if there is an intestacy, Section 7-401 contains a general grant of
powers which can be exercised without application to, approval of, or
109. See A. Sco'r', THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 297, 298.4 (3d ed. 1967).
110. The Governor's Commission acceded to the request that these provisions,
because of their novelty vis-A-vis the Maryland tradition, be given further study by
the Legislative Council during 1969.
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ratification by the court. This general grant includes the power to
retain assets, perform the decedent's contracts, satisfy written charitable
pledges of the decedent, deposit funds in interest-bearing accounts or
short-term loan arrangements, vote stocks, hold securities in the name
of a nominee, insure property of the estate, effect compromises with
creditors, pay taxes, sell or exercise stock subscriptions or options,
consent to reorganizations, dissolutions or liquidations, pay funeral
expenses under certain circumstances, including the cost of burial space
and a suitable tombstone or marker and the cost of perpetual care,"'
employ auditors and investment advisors or other persons, prosecute,
defend or submit to arbitration actions involving the estate, continue
unincorporated businesses for stated periods of time, incorporate valid
claims, discharge security interests, convey redeemable reversions to
the owners of leasehold estates, and make partial distributions. This
grant of powers will eliminate a substantial amount of meaningless
paper-shuffling in the administration of estates.
Where a particular power is not contained in the will or enumer-
ated in Section 7-401, an order of court must be obtained. Thus, in
intestate administrations, a court order must be obtained before any
property can be sold; the procedure should not be cumbersome, how-
ever, because all statutory requirements of orders nisi and published
notices of orders have been repealed.
Inventories and Accounts
The basic requirement that the assets of the estate be inventoried
and that the inventory be filed within three months after the appoint-
ment of the personal representative has not been changed.112  The
new law has done away with a number of separate documents, the
contents of which can now be included in one inventory. For example,
since real property will be part of the probate estate, there will be no
separate real inventory. The list of debts owed to the decedent, with
requirements that they be categorized as sperate or desperate, has
been eliminated. The new, general inventory must include all debts
owed to the decedent and the valuation on the inventory will necessarily
reflect whether they are sperate or desperate. The list of debts due
from the decedent, which is required under Sections 13 and 14 of
present Article 93,"3 has also been eliminated. If a creditor has a
claim, he should file it.
A significant procedural change has been made with respect to
the appraisal of corporate stocks listed on any national or regional
exchange, debts owed to the decedent, including bonds and notes, bank
accounts, building, savings, and loan association shares, and money. 114
The personal representative will be able to value these items himself,
without obtaining any independent appraisal."' It will therefore no
111. See also § 8-106 dealing with payment of funeral expenses without any order
of court, and discussion in the text at note 138 infra.
112. § 7-201.
113. MD. ANN. CoDn art. 93, §§ 13, 14 (1964).
114. §§ 7-201 (a) (4) to 7-201 (a) (5).
115. § 7-202.
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longer be necessary to pay a fee to a court-appointed or other "official"
appraiser to appraise cash items, a fee that has been especially difficult
to justify to members of a decedent's family.
With respect to all other types of property, the personal repre-
sentative must secure an independent appraisal. However, with respect
to one or more assets the value of which he deems fairly debatable,
he may request an appraisal by appraisers appointed by the Register" 6
or he may engage other independent appraisers to assist him in ascer-
taining the fair market value of these other assets." 7 With respect to
stock of closely held corporations, real estate, or other similar assets,
especially where a federal estate tax return will be required and the
services of experts specially qualified in appraising such items must
be obtained, the personal representative will undoubtedly wish to rely
solely upon their valuation and not wish to pay an additional fee to
appraisers appointed by the Register of Wills. If he retains special
appraisers, he need not use appraisers designated by the Register. If
the personal representative uses a charlatan for an appraiser and the
inventoried values are unreasonably low, there is no requirement that
the Register accept them for accounting and inheritance tax purposes;
he then has the opportunity to challenge them and, if the situation is
aggravated enough, to force a reappraisal.
Since the state is interested in correct valuations primarily for
inheritance tax purposes, when the personal representative presents an
account showing distributions on which inheritance taxes are payable,
and the Register has reason to believe that the original, inventoried
value, on which the inheritance tax is then to be calculated, is too low
in relation to fair market values at the date of distribution, he may
request the court to increase the inventory values."' Similarly, if the
values have decreased, the personal representative or any other in-
terested person may petition the court for a downward revision of
values. The time limitation on reappraisals for inheritance tax pur-
poses, contained in Sections 153 and 154 of Article 81,"' has been
repealed; the only time limit under the new law is that the revision
must be accomplished before the estate is closed. 2 °
Another procedural change regarding inventories is the require-
ment that when the inventory is filed, the personal representative must
also file a certificate stating that, within the preceding fifteen days, he
has mailed or delivered to all interested persons a notice that the in-
ventory is being filed.' 2 ' This will insure, for the first time, that the
116. § 7-202(a). § 2-301 gives all Registers the power to appoint standing
appraisers. This is presently the system in Baltimore City and would appear to be a
desirable state-wide option, depending upon the volume in the office, the availability of
qualified personnel and other considerations. The "standing" appraisers need not stand
on a full-time basis. They may stand "on call." In some counties this may be a better
arrangement than the present system under which the personal representative picks
his appraisers. In some jurisdictions, the Orphans' Court is the current appointing
authority. This is completely inappropriate since it is the Register, not the court, who
is charged with the duty of collecting taxes on appraised values.
117. § 7-202(b).
118. § 7-204.
119. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 153-54 (1965).
120. § 7-204.
121. §§ 7-201(b), 7-501.
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interested persons will receive either a copy of the inventory or a
notice that it is being filed. Such persons will no longer be subject to
the practical tyranny of "record notice" which, under the old law,
bound them to know whatever was filed during administration when-
ever it was filed.
With respect to accounts, the substance of the Maryland practice
has been continued. 11 2 However, the time for filing the first account has
been accelerated to eight months after the first publication of the
notice of appointment and notice to creditors.'2 3 The account will
contain not only the information customarily contained in accounts,
but also information with respect to purchases, sales and other
transactions involving assets in the estate which have changed
since the filing of inventory or the last previous account. 124 Since the
necessity for separate reports of sale has been eliminated, the account
must provide this information, as it now does with respect to stock
splits and similar non-sale changes in asset composition. Accounts,
like inventories, when filed, must be accompanied by a certificate
indicating that the personal representative has mailed or delivered a
notice of the filing of the account to all interested persons within the
preceding fifteen days. 12
5
The new requirement that the first account be filed within eight
months after publication of the notice to creditors is part of the statu-
tory policy of encouraging the prompt administration of estates. 126
Section 7-101 (b) provides that "unless the time of distribution shall
be extended by order of Court for good cause shown, the personal
representative shall distribute all the assets of the estate . . . within
the time . . . for rendering his first account." Of course, extensions
may be obtained for filing an account for good cause shown, but, in
the absence of federal estate tax or other significant tax problems, open
claims, unresolved questions which make distribution impossible, or
other reasons for perpetuating the estate beyond the eight month period,
the personal representative should complete the administration of the
estate within that time. Only in very unusual circumstances should
distribution of specific legacies be deferred to a later date.
A good deal of the criticism of probate practice here and in other
states has been directed to the administration of relatively small estates
where, even though there are no appreciable tax problems, the per-
sonal representative keeps the estate open for over a year for no par-
ticular reason. As the report of the Governor's Commission states, it is
expected that the court will grant extensions as a matter of course when
there are federal tax problems, but in the absence of other problems
which present a valid reason for withholding distribution, this should




125. §§ 7-301, 7-501.
126. "Eight" months was selected to give one month after the surviving spouse
had decided whether to elect her statutory share, which she must do within seven
months. § 3-206.
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One other way in which prompt administration of estates has
been encouraged is that the definition of "interested person" does not
include anyone whose legacy has been satisfied in full. Thus, a notice
that the account has been filed must be given to all "interested persons"
within fifteen days before the filing of the account. If there are forty
pecuniary legatees, this notice must be sent to each of the forty who
has not been paid in full. Those legatees who have been paid in full
are no longer "interested persons" and will not be entitled to receive
this notice. Therefore, the personal representative can eliminate some
of his paper work by making prompt distributions.
127
Commissions and Attorneys' Fees
Unfortunate as some may view it, the new statute continues the
present law governing compensation of personal representatives. The
commissions have not been changed. Although real property has been
included in the probate estate, real property, the income therefrom,
and the expenses attributable thereto, will be excluded in computing
the size of the estate for purposes of determining commissions.1
28
This will necessarily be somewhat awkward because a separate cal-
culation will have to be made on the administration account in order
to enable the computation of the personal representative's commis-
sions. Also perpetuated is the ten per cent commission on the sale
of real property by the personal representative.
129
With respect to attorneys' fees, it is expressly stated that the
court, in setting a counsel fee for attorneys, must also take into con-
sideration the aggregate commissions allowed to personal representa-
tives so that the overall charge for administering the estate will not
be unfair or unreasonable.
130
Section 7-502 also provides that the personal representative must
give written notice to each unpaid creditor and to all interested per-
sons of the amount to be requested by the personal representative for
commissions or by the attorney for the estate for counsel fees, along
with the basis in arriving at the requested amount. The court action
with respect to the petition for commissions and attorneys' fees will
be final unless any person who receives the notice requests a hearing
within twenty days of the sending of the notice.3 ' This will insure
the beneficiaries of the estate and any unpaid creditors the opportunity
to present their views with respect to the allowances for commissions
and attorneys' fees. Unfortunately, too often in the past the beneficiaries
of the estate have not learned about the commissions or attorneys' fees
until long after it is too late for them to voice any objection.
127. Other notices to "interested persons" which can be reduced are the notices
that an inventory is being filed (§§ 7-201, 7-501) and that the personal representa-







Claims may be filed either with the personal representative or
with the Register. 13 2 The personal representative may pay any just
claim even if the claim has not been formally filed.1"' The new statute
includes specific provisions with respect to secured claims, 34 con-
tingent claims," 5 the order of priority of claims where an estate is
insolvent,'3 6 the form in which a claim should be filed,137 and similar
procedural matters. Although in general the amount of funeral ex-
penses to be allowed is fixed by the court, Section 8-106 specifically
provides that if the estate is solvent and if the will expressly authorizes
the personal representative to pay funeral expenses without an order
of court, no such order is required.'
There is one major change with respect to the rules of creditors'
claims, in addition to simplification and clarification. The doctrine
of Zollickoffer v. Seth,' 39 that a creditor may proceed against the heirs
or legatees even if he has not filed his claim against the estate, has
been substantially abolished by Section 8-103(a). In many instances,
the assertion of a claim against the heirs or legatees, after the final
distribution of the estate, has resulted in considerable and quite un-
expected hardship. The theory of the new legislation is that at some
point after decedent has died, the heirs and legatees ought to be able
to receive the property with the assurance that no further claims can
be made against them. Creditors must now either commence suit or
file a claim within six months.14 ° The six months' filing period allowed
for creditors' claims will give creditors sufficient time to file their
claims; if they fail to do so, they should not be entitled to proceed
against the distributees of the estate. 41 Unless a claim is filed within
six months, it will also be barred against the personal representative
even if the personal representative has not made distribution.
The present statutory exception from the six month limitations
period with respect to any action covered by an insurance policy or
claims made against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund has







138. See also § 7-401(1).
139. 44 Md. 359 (1876).
140. §§ 8-103(a), 8-104(c).
141. There is one question with respect to creditors' claims not explicitly answered
in the statute or the Commission's report. If the decedent's obligation was expressly
made binding not only on the decedent and his personal representative, but also on
his heirs and legatees, does the reversal of Zollickoffer v. Seth still apply? Thus if
the creditor fails to file his claim within six months, can he still present his claim
against the heirs and legatees if the decedent's contractual obligation expressly men-
tioned heirs and legatees? See Comment, Right of Creditors of a Decedent to Recoverfrom Distributees after the Estate is Closed, 41 MicH. L. Rzv. 920 (1943).
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Distribution
A number of new statutory provisions have been included with
respect to distribution. For example, Section 9-103 deals specifically
with the order of abatement. The manner of valuing and distributing
assets in kind has been set forth in Section 9-104.
Perhaps the most important sections in Subtitle IX, which deals
generally with distribution, are Sections 9-109 and 9-111. Section
9-109 affords the personal representative a galaxy of options with re-
spect to distributions to a minor. If money is distributable to a minor
and there is no guardian, the cash may be deposited in any financial
institution, subject to the further order of court.142 The account book
must be delivered to such person as the personal representative deems
responsible and appropriate. There has been retained in the law the
provision that if the amount is $300.00 or less the personal representa-
tive may, with the approval of the court, pay the amount to anyone
the personal representative deems responsible and appropriate, for
the minor's support.
14 3
Alternatively, with the approval of the court, the personal repre-
sentative may, even without specific authorization in the will, appoint
a custodian under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to hold the prop-
erty pursuant to the provisions of that Act.' 44 With respect to tangible
personal property, the personal representative is given the additional
option to make distributions to anyone the court deems responsible
and appropriate.' 45 If a guardian has been appointed the personal repre-
sentative may distribute any property to the guardian.'4 6
Section 9-111 eliminates the necessity of obtaining releases from
each distributee. If the personal representative desires a release, he
may get one, but he is not obligated to do so.
CLOSING THE ESTATE
For the first time in Maryland there will be a procedure that will
enable the personal representative formally to close an estate and termi-
nate his appointment.' 47 After the expiration of six months from the
date of the published notice required under Section 7-103, the per-
sonal representative may petition the court for an order to close the
estate and terminate his appointment. 48 After twenty days notice to
all interested persons and a hearing, if requested, the court may enter
an appropriate order.'49 If no action or proceeding is pending against
him one year after the date of the order closing the estate and termi-
142. § 9-109(a).
143. § 9-109(b).
144. § 9-109(c). See also text at note 48 supra for additional discussion of this
provision, and text at notes 176-78 infra for discussion of amendments to the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act made by ch. 4, § 1, [1969] Md. Laws 119-27.
145. § 9-109(d).
146. § 9-109(e).
147. §§ 10-101 to 10-105.
148. § 10-101.
149. Since "interested person" does not include anyone who has received his full
distributive share of the estate, the only possible meaning of "interested person" in
this context would be the residuary legatees.
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nating his appointment, the personal representative is automatically
discharged from ordinary liability to interested persons. 5 '
A creditor who has filed a claim and not been paid or an heir or
legatee who has not received his proper share may also have a claim
against the distributees of the estate. Subtitle X of new Article 93
sets alternative statutes of limitations with respect to such claims
against the heirs or legatees. 151 Even though the personal representa-
tive has been discharged and the estate closed, the statute provides that
if property is later discovered, the court, upon petition of an interested
person, may appoint the same personal representative or name a suc-
cessor. 52 If the only act which needs to be performed after the estate
has been closed is a ministerial act, such as executing a release to a
mortgage which has already been discharged in full, the personal repre-
sentative whose authority has been terminated still has the authority
to perform such ministerial or confirmatory acts. 53
ARTICLE 93A
Article 93A contains a comprehensive revision of the Maryland
law relating to guardianships and other devices, such as committees
and conservatorships, for the protection of the property of persons
under disability. It collects into one article all the diverse Maryland
rules with respect to the protection of property of minors and other
disabled persons. It also contains a significant revision of the common
law rule with respect to the disability of a principal who has executed
a power of attorney.
The adoption of Article 93A reflects the displeasure and dissatis-
faction of both the bar and the public with the current law and prac-
tice dealing with guardianships and committees. The appointment of
a guardian for a minor, or a committee for an incompetent, has gener-
ally been looked upon with extreme displeasure because of the archaic
and unnecessarily expensive procedures which the appointment in-
evitably sets in motion. For the past twelve years, the General Assem-
bly has reacted to this situation by creating many new techniques for
avoiding the appointment of a guardian or a committee. In 1957, for
example, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act authorized inter vivos
gifts to a custodian for the benefit of a minor.'54 The custodianship
proved to be such a sensible device for avoiding the expense of un-
necessary guardianships that the General Assembly, on three subse-
quent occasions,' 55 broadened the scope of the Act beyond inter vivos
gifts of securities and cash to include gifts of life insurance policies,
testamentary bequests to a custodian, and transfers to a custodian upon





154. Ch. 137, [1957] Md. Laws 171, now codified as Mo. ANN. CoDe art. 16,§§ 213-22 (1966 & Supp. 1968).
155. Ch. 113, [1962] Md. Laws 374; ch. 502, [1965] Md. Laws 708; ch. 235, [1967]
Md. Laws 556.
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In 1963, the General Assembly passed a statute authorizing a
minor's recovery in tort to be paid to a statutory trustee, who need
not be bonded and need not file annual reports. 156  The purpose of
this procedure was simply to avoid the cumbersome and expensive
guardianship proceeding in those situations.
A reaction to the procedures for committees for incompetents
was the 1957 statute authorizing the appointment of "conservators"
for persons who were not mentally incompetent but who needed a
statutory agent to handle their property. 1 7 The Maryland Rules have
also reflected the disenchantment with the existing law respecting
guardians and committees. For example, although the ancient practice
had been to require every guardian and committee to be bonded, the
Rules have been amended to exempt estates having a value of
less than $10,000.1.1
Notwithstanding the excellence of these recent amendments to the
statutes and rules, no frontal attack had been made on the main body
of law relating to guardians and committees until the introduction of
House Bill No. 558, which proposed new Article 93A." 9
Subtitle I of the new law contains general provisions, such as
definitions, requirements for verification of documents'60 which elimi-
nate the necessity of taking an oath before a notary, jurisdictional
provisions, 161 and other details relating to the powers of the courts
and Registers of Wills.162
The term "guardian"16 is a generic term used to describe anyone
appointed by a court to manage the property of a minor or "disabled
person." It will replace terms such as "committee," which always had
156. MD. ANN. CODt art. 16, §§ 223-30 (1966 & Supp. 1968).
157. MD. ANN. CoD art. 16, §§ 149-51 (1966 & Supp. 1968); MD. R.P. subtit. L.
158. MD. R.P. V73.
159. Ch. 4, [1969] Md. Laws 105. Most of these laws were enacted in the
eighteenth century. Guardians and committees were given no authority to perform
even mere ministerial acts without the formal approval of a court. A partial explana-
tion of the desire to straight-jacket guardians and committees may lie in the fact
that in the eighteenth century, doctrines of fiduciary responsibility which are now
familiar were practically unknown. Today, in Maryland, there are thousands of trusts,
both inter vivos and testamentary for minors as well as adults, by the terms of which
the trustees may exercise quite broad powers without judicial approval. The trustees
are not bonded, and the trustees need not file any accountings in court. A guardian
or committee is nothing more than a trustee. The purpose of Article 93A is to enable
the guardian or committee to perform his acts in much the same manner that the
trustee of a private trust performs his duties, unless court supervision is, because of
special circumstances, equitable. Under present Maryland practice, both guardian-
ships and committees can be avoided through the use of trusts and custodianships,
which are simple and inexpensive to administer. Those persons who are knowledgeable
enough to avoid guardianships and committees, by means of a properly drawn trust
instrument or custodial designation, can save the expense of these proceedings. To
impose these expenses on those who did not plan for the contingencies of a minor's
ownership of property or of incompetency is an unfair result. New Article 93A,
entitled "Protection of Persons under Disability and their Property" is therefore in-
tended to simplify and standardize the laws of Maryland on that subject.
160. Ch. 4, § 1, [1969] Md. Laws 107 (§ 102 of new Article 93A) [hereinafter
cited as Art. 93A, § ____].
161. Art. 93A, § 105.
162. Art. 93A, §§ 106-09.
163. Art. 93A, § 101(d).
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an unpleasant connotation, and "conservator." "Disabled person"'6 4
is a generic term used to describe a person who, for reasons other than
minority, cannot manage his property effectively. The reasons include
physical and mental disability, senility, habitual drunkenness, addiction
to drugs, imprisonment, and detention by a foreign power.'6 5 Basically,
the jurisdiction of the courts has not been changed. The Orphans'
Courts and the Circuit Courts will continue to have concurrent juris-
diction over proceedings involving the property of minors and over
the guardians of the person of any minor. The Circuit Courts will
have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings involving disabled persons
other than minors, such as incompetents.
Subtitle II of new Article 93A contains the heart of the new
statutory scheme. Section 213 provides a broad spectrum of powers
which may be exercised by the guardian without application to,
approval of, or ratification by the court, except as may be otherwise
provided in the instrument which appointed the guardian or as may
be limited by court order. Thus, a guardian may now invest in, sell,
mortgage, exchange or lease any property, borrow money, enter com-
promises, and perform all of the acts which are set forth in Section
7-401 of new Article 93 with respect to the automatic powers of per-
sonal representatives of estates of decedents.' 66
A guardian may sell any type of property, including real estate,
without getting a court order, and purchasers from the guardian or
other persons dealing with the guardian are protected in much the
same way as a purchaser from a trustee of a private trust is protected
in dealing with the trustee. 6" Section 214 gives the guardian the
power to disburse property for the support, care, protection, welfare,
education and clothing of a minor without court authorization or con-
firmation. With respect to other disabled persons, the guardian may,
again without court authorization or confirmation, apply sums from
the income and principal of the estate for the clothing, care, protection,
welfare, and rehabilitation of the disabled person. The present prac-
tice of permitting income and principal to be applied for the benefit of
persons legally dependent upon the minor or disabled person or whom
the disabled person had been maintaining or supporting before the
appointment of the guardian has been continued.
The statute sets forth procedures for appointing the guardian' 6
and for terminating his appointment,'6 9 including termination by death,
disability, resignation, or removal. It permits a foreign guardian to
act in Maryland without filing any formal documents or being appointed
by a Maryland court.' °
164. Art. 93A, § 101 (a). The term "disability" is broader than the terms "mental
disorder", "mental illness," and "mental retardation," contained in § 3 of new Article
59. See note 184 infra.
165. Art. 93A, § 201(b).
166. See pp. 109-10 supra for a brief listing of these powers.
167. See Art. 93A, § 219 and p. 108 supra with respect to identical protection for
purchasers from personal representatives.
168. Art. 93A, § 201.
169. Art. 93A, § 220.
170. Art. 93A, § 222. This provision is not unlike the procedures of §§ 5-501 to
5-506 of new Article 93, which abolish ancillary administration. Art. 93A, § 222,
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One of the major criticisms of all the procedures relating to
guardians and committes relates to the bonding requirements. Section
208(a) specifically states that: "No bond or other security shall be
required of (i) a corporate guardian, (ii) a guardian named in a will
or inter vivos instrument where the instrument excuses the guardian
from giving bond, (iii) a guardian where the estate is less than $10,000,
or (iv) in any other case which the court deems appropriate." Section
208(b) also states that even if a bond is not excused pursuant to
208(a), the amount of the estate upon which the penal sum of a bond
is computed may be reduced if securities or money held by the guardian
are deposited with a financial institution under arrangements requiring
an order of court for their removal. The fee of the financial institution
for this service should be less than the corresponding bond premium.
An inventory must be filed within sixty days after the appoint-
ment of a guardian,'7 1 and accounts must be prepared annually.1 2
The accounts must be filed either with the court or with every in-
terested person. If the account is not filed with the court, the guardian
must file with the court a written verification that the account has been
sent to every interested person. If it is not filed with the court, the
guardian gets no protection with respect to matters disclosed in the
account. 73 If, on the other hand, the guardian does file his accounts
annually, after notice and hearing, the allowance by the court of the
account will be conclusive as to the guardian's liabilities concerning
any matters disclosed in the account. Because the term "guardian" is
used as a generic term to replace all separate forms of arrangements
under court order, such as committees and conservators, all of these
procedures will be the same whether the person whose estate is being
administered is under twenty-one, incompetent, senile, or suffering from
other mental weakness, from addiction to drugs or from alcoholism.
Section 207, which sets forth the priority for the appointment of
guardians, states the first priority, in the event no guardian has been
appointed by a court in a foreign jurisdiction: "a person or corporation
nominated by the minor or disabled person if such designation was
signed by the minor or disabled person after his sixteenth (16th)
birthday and, in the opinion of the court, he had sufficient mental
capacity to make an intelligent choice at the time he executed such
designation."' 74 This will enable competent persons to execute an in-
strument designating the person whom they desire to be their guardian
if they do become incompetent. The same instrument can excuse the
guardian, when appointed, from giving bond. 175
would appear to make unnecessary the more cumbersome procedure of § 9-110 of new
Article 93, which is a recodification of the present procedures for distributing the
assets from a Maryland decedent's estate to the guardian of a foreign incompetent.
171. Art. 93A, § 209(a).
172. Art. 93A, § 209(b).
173. Art. 93A, § 209(c).
174. Art. 93A, § 207(b).
175. Art. 93A, § 208(a) (ii).
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Gifts to Minors Act
Subtitle III of Article 93A contains the Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act as revised in Maryland. The major changes are these:
1. Any type of property may be the subject of a custodial gift,
including real property, tangible personal property, and interests in
partnerships.'7 6
2. A custodian may be designated as the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy or an annuity contract. 77 Although the Uniform Act
had previously permitted custodians to own life insurance policies, it
contained no specific authorization for a custodian to be designated
as a beneficiary. This omission has been corrected.
3. The choice of successor custodians has been broadened. 7 8
Any adult or trust company eligible to become an original custodian
is also eligible under the new law to become a successor custodian.
Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to Minors
Subtitle IV simply recodifies the provisions relating to the pay-
ment of minor's recoveries in tort to a trustee who need not be bonded
or file accounts.
Subtitle V contains a number of other miscellaneous provisions
relating to minors which had been strewn throughout the Maryland
Code. Section 501 permits, without the appointment of a guardian,
limited amounts of money to be paid directly to minors who have
attained the age of eighteen. This provision was derived from Section
383 of Article 48A,'7 9 which had authorized insurance companies to
make payments not in excess of $3,000 per year directly to a minor
who had attained the age of fifteen. In the new law, the amount has
been increased to $5,000 per year, the age has been increased to
eighteen, and the identity of the payor has been broadened to include
"any person," not just insurance companies. If the minor is under
eighteen, and there is no guardian, or the payor has no actual knowl-
edge that there is a guardian, the sums so paid, again not in excess
of $5,000 per year, may be paid to the parent or grandparent of the
minor with whom the minor resides, and if there be none, to a financial
institution which will hold the funds pursuant to further court order.
Section 501 (b) authorizes the Circuit Court to order any money
distributable to a minor from any trust or estate or any other source
to be deposited in a financial institution subject to the further order
of court.
Section 502(a) recodifies the provision of Article 21, which en-
abled married females over the age of sixteen who hold title to property
with their husbands as tenants by the entireties to execute deeds or
mortgages. Section 502(b) continues the provision enabling any
176. Art. 93A, § 301(e) (1).
177. Art. 93A, § 302(d).
178. Art. 93A, § 307(a).
179. MD. ANN. CoDx art. 48A, § 383 (1968).
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veteran or member of the armed forces who is a minor to buy, sell,
and mortgage real estate. Section 502(c) continues certain provisions
heretofore found in Article 48A with respect to the purchase of in-
surance by minors. Section 503 contains provisions relating to shares
in building and loan associations held by minors or minors and
adults jointly.' °
Powers of Attorney
Subtitle VI contains an important modification of common law
rules relating to powers of attorney. At common law a power of
attorney was automatically terminated upon the disability of the princi-
pal. Section 601 now provides that if the power of attorney specifically
states that the power shall not be affected by the disability of the
principal, or that the power of attorney shall become effective only
upon the disability of the principal, the authority of the attorney or
agent shall be exercisable notwithstanding the later disability or in-
capacity of the principal.
The general impression among laymen is that a power of attorney
should be executed, whenever a person is becoming ill or thinks he is,
so as to enable someone else to handle his affairs when he does become
seriously ill. Unfortunately, the common law rules prevent the power
from becoming operative when the illness renders the principal in-
capacitated. This new statutory provision will enable the attorney-
in-fact to act notwithstanding the disability. When the provision is
combined with the provisions of Section 207(b) of Article 93A, it is
expected that many people will execute documents which will: (1)
appoint an attorney-in-fact to act for the principal if the principal
becomes disabled, and (2) appoint a guardian if the principal becomes
disabled and any interested person wants formal guardianship pro-
ceedings instituted.
As a practical matter there will, in most instances, be no guardian-
ship proceeding where there is a power of attorney which survives
disability. Only in the event of a family controversy, where some
interested person wants a guardian formally appointed, will there be
any necessity for a guardianship proceeding where a power of attorney
that would survive disability is already in existence. If a guardianship
proceeding is commenced, however, a guardian designated by the dis-
abled person when he was still competent will be entitled to be ap-
pointed by the court. If the same instrument excused him from
giving bond, he will not be required to post a bond. If the person
appointed guardian is not the same person designated in the power
of attorney, the guardian will have the power to revoke, suspend or
terminate the power of attorney. Section 602 gives protection to any
person who acts without actual knowledge of the termination of a
power of attorney.' 8'
180. This provision was included in the statute by mistake. It was derived from
MD. ANN. CODS art. 23, § 148 (1966), which was repealed by ch. 422, [1968] Md.
Laws 611, and supplanted by another provision dealing with minors' accounts in build-
ing and loan associations.
181. Similar, though not as comprehensive, provisions had been included in MD.
ANN. COD4 art. 10, § 42 (1968).
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Guardian of the Person
Subtitle VII of Article 93A deals with guardians of the person.
Section 701 continues the Maryland law whereby the surviving parent
of a minor may, by will, appoint one or more guardians and successor
guardians of the person of an unmarried minor.' This type of
guardian need not be approved by, or qualify in, any court. If there
is no testamentary appointment, any person interested in the welfare
of the minor may petition the court to appoint a guardian of the
person.'" 3 The minor, if he is fourteen or older, has the power
to designate a guardian of the person unless this decision is not in his
best interests. The statute specifically provides, however, that it is not
to be construed to require court appointment of a guardian of the per-
son for a minor where there is no good reason, such as a dispute, for
a court appointment. In many instances there will be immediate agree-
ment among the members of the family as to who the guardian of the
person should be, and there will be no necessity for court proceedings.
In addition, the guardian of the person need not post any bond or
file any accounts.
Section 704 gives the court the power to superintend and direct
the care of the person of a disabled person who is suffering from a
disability other than minority. This provision is not intended to abro-
gate or affect in any way the extensive procedures set forth in Article
59 for commitment to mental institutions.""
CONCLUSION
The major significance of Chapters 3 and 4 of the Laws of 1969
is not the overdue substantive revisions of the Maryland laws relating
to the estates of decedents, minors, and incompetents. Rather, it is the
apparent recognition by the General Assembly that the entire Maryland
Code needs a complete reorganization and recodification. Chapters 3
and 4 represent the first step.
Such a comprehensive reorganization of the Code should accom-
plish several things:
1. The collection into one Article of material on the same subject
which is presently scattered throughout the Code. This aim has
been accomplished by new Articles 93 and 93A with respect to the
subjects of the estates of decedents, minors, and disabled persons.
The bench, the bar, and the General Assembly would all benefit
from the destruction of the jig-saw pattern of Maryland statutes
presently in force. The juxtaposition of all the statutes dealing with
one subject would automatically reveal the inconsistencies and the
182. See also Note, Appointment of a Guardian by Will, 34 ROCKY MT. L. Rtv.
200 (1961). The old Maryland law was contained in MD. ANN. COD art. 72A,
§ 4 (1967), and MD. ANN. CODn art. 93, § 164 (1964). By oversight only § 164 of
Article 93 was repealed. The Report of the Committee of the State Bar Association
that drafted Article 93A also recommended the repeal of § 4 of Article 72A. The
omission of the additional repealer was solely a drafting error and was not intentional.
183. Art. 93A, § 702(a).
184. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 1, 22, 32, 33 (1964).
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overlappings of our present laws and may be expected to result in
many improvements.
For example, there should be one Article dealing with Procedure
and the Courts which could serve as a convenient companion volume
to the Maryland Rules. It could include such matters as Appeals(Article 5), Arbitration (Article 7), Attachment (Article 9), Execu-
tion (Article 83, Sections 1-14), Mandamus (Article 60), the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (Article 41, Sections 244-256), Abatement
and Revivor (Article 16, Section 1 and Article 75, Sections 15, 15A,
and 15B), Pleadings, Practice and Process at Law (Article 75),
Equity practice, including auditors, injunctions, general jurisdiction,
and specific performance (Article 16, Sections 6-10, 91, 93, 96, 99,
107, 114-118, 131, and 169), Prohibited Actions (Article 75C),
Slander of Females (Article 88), Limitations of Actions (Article 57),
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (Article 31A), Uniform Absent
Persons Act (Article 16, Sections 200-212), Evidence (Article 35),
Notaries Public (Article 68), Acknowledgments (Article 18), Juries
(Article 51), Costs (Article 24), Fines and Forfeitures (Article 38),
Fees of Officers (Article 36), Justices of the Peace (Article 52),
Clerks of Court (Article 11), Constables (Article 20), and Sheriffs
(Article 87).
In the Commercial Law area, a single Article could include not
only the Uniform Commercial Code (Article 95B), but also such
matters as Bills of Exchange and Protest (Article 13), Bills of Lading(Article 14), Warehouse Receipts (Article 14A), the Uniform Fiduci-
aries Act (Article 37A, Sections 1-15), the Uniform Act for the
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers (Article 37, Sections
16-25), the Fair Trade Act, Unfair Sales Act, Unfair Cigarette Sales
Act, Consumer Protection Act, Retail Installment Sales Act, the Retail
Credit Accounts Law, and Finance Company laws (all in Article 83),
Consumer Loans (Article 58A), Interest and Usury (Article 49),
Currency (Article 29), Agents and Factors (Article 2), and Assign-
ments of Choses in Action (Article 8).
An Article on Family Law would include not only the material
on alimony, divorce, annulment, paternity, adoption, and changes of
name found in Article 16, but also Husband and Wife (Article 45),
Marriages (Article 62), Parent and Child (Article 72A), and Support
of Dependents (Article 89C).
A Property Article would include Conveyancing, Land Install-
ment Sales Contracts, and the Horizontal Property Act (Article 21),
Landlord-Tenant (Article 53), Mechanics' Liens (Article 63), Mort-
gages (Article 66), Zoning and Planning (Article 66B), Regional
Planning Council (Article 78D), Eminent Domain (Article 33A),
Land Patents (Article 54, Sections 12-53), Bounding Lands (Article
15), miscellaneous provisions dealing with deeds, burial grounds, quiet
title proceedings, partition, judicial sales, and ground rents contained
in Article 16, Merger (Article 64), Aliens (Article 3), and Estrays,
Vessels Adrift, and Drift Logs (Article 34).
An article on State Government would deal with the General
Assembly (Article 40), Governor-Executive and Administrative De-
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partments (Article 41), Comptroller (Article 19), Public Debt (Article
31), Treasurer (Article 95), Budget Procurement (Article 15A),
Public Works (Article 78A), Merit System (Article 64A), Pensions
(Article 73B), Department of Law (Article 32A), Officers (Article
69), Official Oaths (Article 70), Publication of Laws (Article 76),
State Reporter (Article 80), Hall of Records (Article 54), Militia
(Article 65), State Police (Article 88B), Civil Defense (Article 16A),
State Roads (Article 88C), and Elections (Article 33).
A Criminal Law Article would include not only the materials
presently found in Article 27, but also Habeas Corpus (Article 42),
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (Article 26A), and Defective
Delinquents (Article 31B).
A brief Article on Creditors' and Debtors' Proceedings would
encompass the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Article 39B),
Insolvents (Article 47), and various provisions of Article 16 dealing
with trusts for the benefit of creditors (Article 16, Sections 175, 177,
and 183).
A "Welfare" Article would include the State Department of
Social Services (Article 88A), Unemployment Insurance (Article
95A), Commission on the Aging (Article 70B), Almshouses and
Trustees of the Poor (Article 4), Deaf, Mute or Blind (Article 30),
Mental Health (Article 59), the Interstate Compact on Mental Health
(Article 41, Sections 319-338), and Juvenile Services (Article 52A).
The Water Resources Article (96A) could be expanded to in-
clude the State Boat Act (Article 14B), Ferries (Article 37), Pilots
(Article 74), Seamen (Article 84), and the Maryland Port Authority
(Article 62B).
The various rules regulating the professions, law (Article 10),
dentistry (Article 32), engineering and land surveying (Article 75%),
public accountants (Article 75A), the enormous range of doctors
(Article 43), architects (Article 43), and real estate brokers (Article
56), could conveniently be collected in one Article.
2. The elimination of archaici s5 and purely local' materials
from the Code.
3. The review by the General Assembly of British Statutes in
Force in Maryland. There should be a statutory codification of those
British statutes which are still relevant and an express statutory repeal
of all those British statutes which, regardless of their former importance,
are no longer relevant. It seems incredible that substantial questions of
landlord-tenant relationships and of criminal law often turn on the inter-
pretation of statutes which are sometimes five hundred years old, which
are not found in the libraries of most Maryland lawyers, and which,
if the opinion of Julian J. Alexander, Esquire,18 7 was incorrect, may
185. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 46, § 5 (1965), dealing with descent of a
naked trust.
186. There can be little justification in a statewide Code for a separate Article on
laundries in Baltimore City and Baltimore County. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 55 (1964).
187. J. ALEXANDER, A COLLECTION OV THE BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARY-
LAND (1870).
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not even be the law of Maryland. There must be more fruitful ways for
lawyers to spend their time than speculating on the accuracy of Mr.
Alexander's 1870 opinion as to the state of the Maryland law in 1776.
The lack of statutory revision exists at the federal level, as well.
Consider the Robinson-Patman Act,' "a singularly opaque and elusive
statute,"8 9 which has not been amended once in thirty-three years not-
withstanding the unanimity of scholarly opinion that the Act is very
badly drafted. 90 Congressional failure to correct such obviously inade-
quate statutes as the Limitation of Liability Act or the Copyright Act of
1909 are additional examples. Judge Friendly's brilliant essay, The
Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't,'' details many other examples.
Judge Friendly concludes that legislators simply do not have the
time to deal with the technical legal matters of the kind that neces-
sarily would be involved in a broad-scale revision of the Maryland
Code or even a wide-scale revision of several major areas of substan-
tive law. Dean Pound pointed out to the American Bar Association
that: "Our legislative organization and legislative methods are devised
for appropriations and political legislation, not for legislation on legal
matters."' 92 Dean Pound and Chief Judge Cardozo both called for
a "ministry of justice" to do the work that the legislators generally
dislike. Urgings of this kind resulted in the creation of the New
York Law Revision Commission.
To be sure this idea is not new even in Maryland. In 1901, Mr.
Alexander Armstrong urged the Maryland State Bar Association
to create a Permanent Law Reform Commission to be appointed
by the Governor.' 93 Nothing was done. The suggestion reappeared as
a recommendation at the Association's 1968 Annual Meeting.194
If a permanent law revision commission is not established in
Maryland, perhaps the General Assembly would recommend the ap-
pointment of a special commission to reorganize the Maryland Code
in the manner suggested. Thus, the spirit which prompted the enact-
ment of Chapters 3 and 4 of the Laws of 1969 would not wane.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b) (1964).
189. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (Mr. Justice Harlan).
190. See Anonymous, Eine Kleine Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARV. L.
Rev. 921, 922 (1966).
191. 63 CoLum. L. Rlv. 787, 793 (1963).
192. Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 142, 145 (1919). A
similar approach is taken in R. KEXTON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE: PROCESSES AND
ISSU4S O PRIVATx LAW REFORM (1968).
193. 6 TRANS. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N 158 (1901).
194. See Report, Committee on Long Range Planning, 73 TRANS. MD. STATIE
BAR Ass'N, No. 2, 189 (1968).
